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after rejection. After a circuit split as to this question, the Supreme Court, in Mission Products
Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC (“Mission”), finally attempted to create a legal standard to
apply to rejected trademark executory contracts, however the holding in this case left some
lingering ambiguities. What remains ultimately clear from the holding in Mission is that
rejection does not rescind the trademark rights previously granted by an executory contract. This
memorandum explores (1) the legal standard and confusion that led to the circuit split prior to
Mission, (2) the current law as articulated in Mission, and (3) some of the remaining ambiguities
post Mission.
I.

The Legal Standard when Applied to Trademark Rights in the Rejection of an
Executory Contract Remained Ambiguous Prior to Mission
A. The Fourth Circuit Held that Rejection of an Executory Contract Withdraws Any
Intellectual Property Rights Granted Therein
In 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first addressed the ability of a non-

debtor to continue using intellectual property following rejection of a contract under chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code.3 This case involved an executory contract licensing a patent.4 The
licensor filed and was eventually approved for both chapter 11 bankruptcy and rejection of the
contract between the parties.5 In this case, the relevant question was whether the licensee could
continue to use the patent, or if that right terminates at the time of rejection. The Fourth Circuit
analyzed legislative history to decide this question and reasoned that while rejection of a contract
under section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code equates to a breach of contract, outside of
bankruptcy, legislative history makes clear that the “purpose of the provision is to provide only a
damages remedy for the non-bankrupt party.”6 The court then applied this reasoning and found
that the licensee of a patent cannot rely on provisions in an executory agreement providing for

See Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers (“Lubrizol), 752 F.2d 1043, 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1044.
5 Id.
6 Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., 752 F.2d at 1048.
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continued use of the patent upon “breach” of the contract by the licensor during rejection.7 Said
differently, a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract worked to revoke its grant of a patent
license.8
When the Fourth Circuit interpretation of 365(g) is applied, only money damages are
available to the licensee, not continued use of the intellectual property.9 The allowance of
specific performance (continued use of the patent rights) would “seriously undercut the core
purpose of rejection.”10 The court concluded that through rejecting the contract, the right to use
the patent was terminated.11
B. Congress Amended Section 365(n) to Ensure the Continuation of Intellectual
Property Licenses in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, but did not include Trademark in
the Definition of Intellectual Property
Following the decision in Lubrizol, Congress quickly amended Bankruptcy Code Section
365(n) to effectively reverse the Fourth Circuit’s holding and ensure the continuation of
intellectual property licenses after rejection of executory contracts in bankruptcy cases.12 This
amendment clarified the actual congressional intent behind rejecting an executory contract
licensing intellectual property rights.13 The licensee of intellectual property rights has the choice
to treat the rejection of an executory contract as a termination of the contract, or to retain its
rights to the intellectual property under section 365(n).14 Through this amendment, Congress
clarified that the intent of rejection is not to provide mere monetary damages but to give a
licensee a choice between damages or the ability to continue to exercise the rights provided in
the executory contract.

Id.
Id. at 1045–48.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 1045–48.
12 102 Stat. 2538 (1988).
13 Id.
14 Id.
7
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This clarification should have provided certainty regarding the question of the
continuation of intellectual property rights after contract rejection, subject to one caveat. Section
101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademark” in the definition of intellectual
property.15 This section defines intellectual property as “includes trade secrets, patents, patent
applications, plant varieties, copyrights and mask works for semiconductor chip products.”16
Consequently, circuit courts split on how to bridge the gap between section 365(n), the intent of
Congress, and the absence of trademark in section 101(35A).17
C. A Circuit Split Resulted from the Courts Struggling to Ascertain a Clear Legal
Standard as Applied to Trademark Rights in the Rejection of an Executory Contract
In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC (“Sunbeam
Products”), the Seventh Circuit attempted to answer whether section 365(n) applies to executory
contracts for trademark rights.18 In Sunbeam Products, the circuit court sought to decide whether
Lubrizol correctly determined whether intellectual property rights terminate after rejection of an
executory contract.19 The court analogized the rejection in this case with breaching the contract
before bankruptcy.20 The parties would have several options to remedy the breach, and the court
reasons that “[o]utside of bankruptcy, a licensor’s breach does not terminate a licensee’s right to
use intellectual property” and that during a breach and consequently, during rejection, “nothing
about this process implies that any rights … have been vaporized.”21 If rejection of a contract is
equivalent to a breach, then rejection “merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform and
has absolutely no effect upon the contract’s continued existence.”22 As far as the absence of
trademark in section 101(35A), the court explained that the “limited definition in § 101(35A)

11 U.S.C. §101(35A) (2012).
Id.
17 See Mission Products Holdings, Inc., 587 U.S. ___, 17.
18 686 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2012).
19 See Id. at 376.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 377
22 Id. at 376.
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means that § 365(n) does not affect trademarks one way or another” and that Congress left
trademark out of the definition merely for “more time for study, not to approve” and the effect of
amending section 365(n) remains the same for trademark cases.23 Obviously unpersuaded by
Lubrizol, the Seventh Circuit held that rejection equates to breach of a contract, and trademark
rights are exercisable after rejection.24
Following Sunbeam Products, the First Circuit decided a similar intellectual property
issue, regarding trademarks in an executory contract after rejection.25 In this case the
debtor/licensor, Tempnology, LLC, manufactured clothing and accessories designed to stay cool
during exercise.26 Tempnology marketed the products under a brand name “Coolcore,” using
trademarks to distinguish this particular athletic gear from other ordinary workout gear on the
market.27 In 2012, Tempnology entered into a contract with the petitioner, Mission Product
Holdings, Inc. (“Mission”), pursuant to which Tempnology granted Mission an exclusive license
to distribute certain Coolcore products and a non-exclusive license to use Coolcore trademarks.28
Before the agreement expired, Tempnology filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New
Hampshire. Soon afterward, the bankruptcy court had to decide whether a rejection of the
executory contract between Tempnology and Mission deprives Mission of its rights to use the
trademark licensed to them under the contract. The bankruptcy court allowed Tempnology to
reject the executory licensing agreement with Mission.29

Id. at 375.
Id. at 377.
25 See In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 289 (1st Cir. 2018).
26 See Mission Products Holdings, Inc, 587 U.S. ___, 17 (2019).
27 Id. at 1.
28 Id. at 2.
29 Id. at 3.
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Consequently, Mission lost the previously granted rights to use the Coolcore trademark.
This case followed the appeals process through the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, which adopted
the Seventh Circuit rationale, and held that Mission’s rights to the Coolcore trademark did not
seize to exist upon Tempnology’s rejection of the contract.30 However, following the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision, the First Circuit rejected this line of reasoning and adopted
the Fourth Circuit rationale holding that upon rejection of the contract, Mission’s rights to the
Coolcore trademark were revoked upon the rejection of the contract.31 Because of this
disagreement between the circuits as to how to apply section 365(n) to trademark cases, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard this case to resolve the circuit split and attempt to
provide a clear framework for these cases moving forward.
II. Trademarks Now Considered Intellectual Property under Section 365(n) and Contract
Rejection in Chapter 11 Cases Does not Terminate Trademark Licenses
On review, the Supreme Court upheld the rationale used in the Seventh Circuit, and the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract giving rights to a
trademark under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code has the same effect as a breach of that
contract outside bankruptcy.32 Thus, the Supreme Court clarified that rejection does not grant
any special rights to debtors that are not awarded in a regular breach of contract situation outside
of bankruptcy. The Court reasoned that Congress amended section 365(n) to “reinforce and
clarify the general rule that contractual rights survive rejection” and even if trademarks are
absent from section 101(35A) the congressional intent of intellectual property rights surviving
rejection still applies.33

In re Tempnology, LLC, 559 B.R. 809, 830–823 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA1 2016).
In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 2018).
32 Mission Products Holdings, Inc., 587 U.S. at 16.
33 Id. at 13–14.
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Currently, in the case of a rejection of an executory contract that licenses trademark
rights, trademarks are intellectual property for the purposes of section 101(35A) and
consequently, section 365(n) applies equally to trademark cases and does not terminate the
previously granted trademark rights. The licensee has a choice between terminating the contract
and pursuing regular breach of contract remedies, or to retain its rights under the contract.34
III. Legal Standard Set Forth in Mission Products Holdings, Inc. does not Entirely Clear
Up the Ambiguities in Trademark Contract Rejection Cases
The Supreme Court in Mission acknowledged that Congress omitted “trademark” in
section 101(35A). This omission still leaves an ambiguity as to Congressional intent. The
Supreme Court provided a clear understanding that rejection is a breach of contract, and now
allows lawyers to foresee licensees choosing to continue to exercise their trademark rights after
rejection. In her concurrence in Mission, however, Justice Sotomayor stated that the Court did
not “decide that every trademark licensee has the unfettered right to continue using licensed
marks postrejection."35 It is, therefore, “unclear if trademark licensees are required to
continue making royalty payments with no right to deduct damages from their payments even
if they otherwise could have done so under nonbankruptcy law–or if such a deduction is
indeed available to a trademark licensee electing to retain its rights to use a mark.”36 This
uncertainty, echoing Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, leaves Congress the opportunity to
tailor a provision specifically for trademark licenses and to address the extent trademark
licensees are distinct in comparison to licensees of other forms of intellectual property.37

102 Stat. 2538.
See Mission Products Holdings, Inc., 587 U.S. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
36 See Elizabeth Burkhard, Phillip Nelson & Lynne Xerras, Mission (Products) Accomplished: Trademark License
Not Rescinded Upon Rejection in Bankruptcy – Supreme Court Decision Ends Circuit Split, Interprets Bankruptcy
Code Section 256(g) Broadly and Favorably (May 28, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/mission-productsaccomplished-trademark-69512/#_edn26.
37 See Mission Products Holdings, Inc., 587 U.S. at 2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
34
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Further, because of the decision in Mission, debtors/licensors now need to consider that
while the Bankruptcy Code favors reorganization, “it does not permit anything and everything
that might advance that goal.”38 As a result of the integration of non-bankruptcy law needed to
determine the scope of the non-debtor party’s rights in trademark licensing contracts, there is
now a degree of uncertainty in the planning and strategy of many potential chapter 11
bankruptcy cases involving intellectual property.39 The debtor/licensor may have to choose
between expending scarce resources on quality control and reputation of their trademark on the
one hand, or risking the loss of a valuable asset, in this case their trademark, on the other.40
Although Tempnology argued that either choice would impede a debtor’s ability to reorganize41
the Supreme Court made clear that a breach is a breach, and there are no special provisions when
looking to bankruptcy law, or elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Mission provided a clear legal standard for trademark contract
rejection cases moving forward. When a contract terminates in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case, and
the contract licenses out trademark rights, then section 365(n) prevails. The licensee retains all of
the rights provided under section 365(n). Bankruptcy law need not be held separately from
regular contract law, and that while “trademark” might be missing from section 101(35A), it
should be treated, for now, as if it is not.

Id. at 15.
See Jason B. Binford, The Supreme Court Decision Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC Has
Broad Implications for Licenses and Other Agreements in Bankruptcy: Analysis (May 22, 2018),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/05/supreme-court-decision-mission-products-analysis.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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